Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2016

Law and Politics, an Emerging Epidemic: A Call for EvidenceBased Public Health Law
Michael Ulrich
Boston University School of Public Health

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Evidence Commons, Health Law and Policy
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Ulrich, Law and Politics, an Emerging Epidemic: A Call for Evidence-Based Public Health Law , in
42 American Journal of Law and Medicine 256 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1186

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

American Journal of Law & Medicine, 42 (2016): 256-283
American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, © 2016 The Author(s)
Boston University School of Law
DOI: 10.1177/0098858816658270

LAW AND POLITICS, AN EMERGING
EPIDEMIC: A CALL FOR EVIDENCEBASED PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Michael R. Ulrich†

As Jacobson v. Massachusetts recognized in 1905, the basis of public health law,
and its ability to limit constitutional rights, is the use of scientific data and empirical
evidence. Far too often, this important fact is lost. Fear, misinformation, and politics
frequently take center stage and drive the implementation of public health law. In the
recent Ebola scare, political leaders passed unnecessary and unconstitutional
quarantine measures that defied scientific understanding of the disease and caused
many to have their rights needlessly constrained. Looking at HIV criminalization and
exemptions to childhood vaccine requirements, it becomes clear that the blame cannot
be placed on the hysteria that accompanies emergencies. Indeed, these examples
merely illustrate an unfortunate array of examples where empirical evidence is
ignored in the hopes of quelling paranoia. These policy approaches are not only
constitutionally questionable, they generate their own risk to public health. The ability
of the law to jeopardize public health approaches to infectious disease control can,
and should, be limited through a renewed emphasis on science as the foundation of
public health, coordination through all levels and branches of government, and
through a serious commitment by the judiciary to provide oversight. Infectious disease
creates public anxiety, but this cannot justify unwarranted dogmatic approaches as a
response. If we as a society hope to ensure efficient, constitutional control over the
spread of disease, it is imperative that science take its rightful place at the forefront of
governmental decision-making and judicial review. Otherwise, the law becomes its
own public health threat.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill warned, “[t]he preventative function of
government . . . is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the
punitory function . . . .”1 This has indeed played out on numerous occasions
throughout this country’s history, especially when driven by the paranoia and
misinformation that tends to accompany the potential spread of infectious disease. 2
“An epidemic of fear has accompanied the spread of the disease and with it, public
attention has turned to quarantine, one of the oldest tools of public health.” 3 Wendy
Parmet wrote this in 1985 in reference to the AIDS epidemic and the call to quarantine
infected individuals; nevertheless, it is equally applicable for the 2014 Ebola
“outbreak” in the United States where fear spread almost uncontrollably. 4
Mainstream media outlets ran stories with attention grabbing headlines, such as
Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4 Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates.5 What
likely raised more concern were the reports about the possibility, or even likelihood,6
that the virus would mutate and become airborne. 7 With the pervasiveness of these
news stories during the Ebola epidemic, it is no surprise that the United States public
began to panic, with two-thirds of Americans worried about a widespread epidemic
1

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 56 (1880).
Wendy E. Parmet, J.S. Mill and the American Law of Quarantine, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 210, 214
(2008) [hereinafter Parmet, J.S. Mill].
3
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
53, 53 (1985) [hereinafter Parmet, AIDS] (footnote omitted).
4
See id. Though the term outbreak was often applied, its use was questionable given the disease and
threat of spreading. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
5
Denise Grady, Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4 Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/health/ebola-cases-could-reach-14-million-in4-months-cdc-estimates.html?_r=0. Within the text of the story it became clear that this was merely a
projection of a worst-case scenario. Id.
6
Lizzie Parry, It Is ‘Very Likely’ That the Ebola Virus Will Spread Through Airborne Particles,
Experts Say, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2961381/It-likelyEbola-virus-spread-airborne-particles-say-experts.html.
7
Sarah Larimer, Will the Ebola Virus Go Airborne? (And Is That Even the Right Question?), WASH.
POST (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/09/15/will-the-ebolavirus-go-airborne-and-is-that-even-the-right-question/ [http://perma.cc/LF6Q-5ESE]; Michael T. Osterholm,
TIMES
(Sept.
11,
2014),
What
We’re
Afraid
to
Say
About
Ebola,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/opinion/what-were-afraid-to-say-about-ebola.html. A response to
Osterholm’s New York Times article was published in the presumably less popular Virology Blog,
explaining that the chance of Ebola mutating to create an airborne threat was “so remote that we should not
use it to frighten people.” Vincent Racaniello, What We Are Not Afraid to Say About Ebola Virus,
VIROLOGY BLOG (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.virology.ws/2014/09/18/what-we-are-not-afraid-to-sayabout-ebola-virus/ [http://perma.cc/3RZM-8VJK].
2
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breaking out in the states, even though that epidemic was almost entirely contained to
West Africa.8 After all, “[e]xaggerated risks . . . produce extreme responses.” 9
That a community can be plagued by such hysteria during an infectious disease
scare is not necessarily unexpected,10 but when fear is almost completely unfounded,
hysteria generates its own potential harm. Ultimately, the Ebola “emergency” in the
United States resulted in four confirmed cases and one death, 11 which is nothing to
overlook, but not close to the potential airborne outbreak that many feared. Yet, the
alarm and politicization of the fear turned the law into a new threat to public health.
In the aftermath of the Ebola scare, there was a failure to assess the harm caused
by those in leadership positions whose desire to appease the fearful masses lead them
to make decisions and wield the law in a manner that may have jeopardized disease
control efforts.12 By disregarding expertise and empirical evidence, too many public
officials made uninformed decisions with indifference to the impact those decisions
might have on the ability to contain the disease. 13 Moreover, both the lack of informed
decision-making and the subjugation of civil liberties that ran counter to effective
public health science raise serious concerns of constitutionality.
The story of Kaci Hickox, a nurse who worked with Doctors Without Borders to
fight Ebola in Sierra Leone, is an example of the consequences that can result from
dogmatic approaches to infectious disease control.14 On October 24, 2014, Ms. Hickox
landed at Newark Liberty International Airport,15 the same day that the governors of
New York and New Jersey announced mandatory quarantines for anyone who had
contact with an individuals infected with Ebola.16 Using a forehead scanner, officials
found that Ms. Hickox had a recorded temperature of 101 degrees. 17 Given that she
had an initial reading of 98 degrees, Ms. Hickox stated that the slightly elevated
temperature could have been caused by being flushed, frustrated, and stressed from
8
Brady Dennis & Peyton M. Craighill, Ebola Poll: Two-thirds of Americans Worried About Possible
POST
(Oct.
14,
2014),
Widespread
Epidemic
in
U.S.,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/ebola-poll-two-thirds-of-americans-worried-aboutpossible-widespread-epidemic-in-us/2014/10/13/d0afd0ee-52ff-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html
[http://perma.cc/GAA8-DF7D].
9
George J. Annas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55 FLA L. REV. 1171,
1178 (2003). All the more reason why public health response should be based on science for accurate risk
assessment. Id.
10
See James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and Response, NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 355, 357 (2015) (finding that the public’s understanding of risk and governmental
power can become distorted during a perceived public health threat, especially if propelled by irresponsible,
misinformed media).
11
2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa – Case Counts, CDC, (updated Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [http://perma.cc/4RP9-DXWV].
12
See Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5 (2015)
(blaming the United States’ response to Ebola, in part, on “elected officials who ignored the advice of public
health experts and imposed unnecessary quarantines that succeeded only in spreading public panic”).
13
Id. (finding it counterproductive for states to disregard CDC recommendations despite a lack of
evidence that their measures of social distancing would improve the chance to control disease spread).
14
Liz Robbins et al., Unapologetic, Christie Frees Nurse From Ebola Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/nyregion/nurse-in-newark-to-be-allowed-to-finish-ebolaquarantine-at-home-christie-says.html.
15
Id.
16
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s Press Office, Governor Andrew Cuomo and Governor Chris Christie
Announce Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at JFK and Newark Liberty International Airports (Oct.
24,
2014),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-andrew-cuomo-and-governor-chris-christieannounce-additional-screening-protocols-ebola [http://perma.cc/F46Q-DHW5].
17
Kaci Hickox, Her Story: UTA Grad Isolated at New Jersey Hospital in Ebola Quarantine, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/ebola/headlines/20141025-uta-grad-isolatedat-new-jersey-hospital-as-part-of-ebola-quarantine.ece [http://perma.cc/ZW7L-5JME].
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being in custody for four hours with little food, water, or information about why she
was being detained.18 After working for weeks to treat Ebola patients, and waiting for
six hours in an airport,19 Ms. Hickox was then taken to a tent outside of University
Hospital in Newark, where she was tested again with an oral thermometer, which is
more accurate.20 Despite normal readings, negative blood tests, and no sign of
symptoms, Ms. Hickox was held in the tent for eighty hours before being escorted
back to her home in Maine amidst the threat of a lawsuit against the State of New
Jersey.21
This story is just a microcosm of the manner in which politicization of public
health can impact individuals and efforts to fight infectious disease. Ms. Hickox had
her individual rights unnecessarily constrained, but this type of treatment of a
healthcare worker could have downstream effects on the ability to convince other
healthcare workers to join the frontline battle of containment and treatment. Though
quarantining asymptomatic individuals is not the only manner in which
misinformation, hysteria, and politics can play a large role in public health decisionmaking, it goes to the heart of the challenge of public health law: “the balancing of
individual and societal interests.”22 Improper justification for decisions raises both
public health and constitutional concerns.
Although the law establishes substantial powers to protect the public’s health, it is
worth considering whether the use of these powers does in fact lead to better health
outcomes. The use of public health authority and coercive measures is neither
necessary nor sufficient to ensure protection of the public’s health, and use of this
power cannot be justified unless it has a reasonable, scientifically based ability to
protect the general welfare. While the law is often discussed as a way to improve
health, it is important to note that the law can also have adverse health impacts. If used
improperly, the use of public health powers could enable the spread of disease and,
consequently, become a danger to the population’s wellbeing. 23
Part I of this article examines the foundation of public health law, which uses
scientific and data-driven decision-making to justify infringement upon individual
liberties. While there can be no doubt that the government has the authority, and
arguably the obligation, to infringe upon individual interests for the protection of the
general welfare, it is just as certain that this power in not unbounded. The individual
can only be asked to sacrifice for the common good when that sacrifice is likely to in
fact protect the public’s health, and even then, only to the extent necessary to achieve
that goal.
Part II illustrates that the scientific foundations of public health law’s power are
often overlooked and ignored, thereby generating an independent public health threat.
While this happens in emergency situations such as an Ebola outbreak, the emergence
of legal threats cannot be blamed merely on the irrationality that stems from a sudden
crisis. Indeed, even policies aimed at minimizing the public health impact of HIV and
childhood infectious diseases succumb to politics rather than reasoning based in the
law and public health.

18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.; Hodge, supra note 10, at 367-68; Sheri Fink, Ebola Crisis Passes, but Questions on Quarantines
Persist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/health/ebola-crisis-passes-butquestions-on-quarantines-persist.html.
22
Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5.
23
See discussion infra Part II.
19
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Part III makes a plea for a reemphasis of the connection between science,
empirical evidence, and public health law. Regardless of the level or branch of
government discussed, science too often takes a backseat to the momentum of politics
and fear. To truly fight disease outbreaks, the focus must be on health—meaning that
evidence-based law must be at the forefront of public health decision-making. Ad hoc,
unjustifiable responses have the potential to diminish trust, drive people from the
healthcare system or to conceal their potential infections, and discourage or punish
essential healthcare workers. Keeping in mind the realities of limited resources,
adopted policies must be likely to generate better health, which may require more
stringent judicial oversight. Evidence-based law is necessary because misinformed
enforcement mechanisms tend to exacerbate negative health outcomes, as well as
violate constitutional standards.
II. SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Public health law has been defined as:
[T]he study of the legal powers and duties of the state, in collaboration
with its partners . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . .
and of the limitations on the power of the state to constrain for the
common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, and other
legally protected interests . . . .24
In other words, public health law means determining the appropriate balance between
what the government is obligated and authorized to do to protect the public’s health,
and what it cannot do in terms of infringing on individual rights. 25 Implicit in this
definition is that the government must take positive action to ensure the public’s
health, and in terms of infectious diseases, even those who argue for a limited scope of
governmental public health authority find that preventing the spread of disease falls
within the State’s obligations.26 The government takes public health action through the
police power, which is “[t]he inherent authority of the state . . . to enact laws and
promulgate regulations to protect, preserve, and promote the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the people.”27
In terms of infectious disease response, the balance between both the State’s
obligations and its limitations is key. Individuals can act as carriers and spread the
24
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER].
25
See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that “the central ethical conflict of public health [is] the
balancing of individual and societal interests”).
26
GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 24, at 5-6 (“The government has primary responsibility for the public’s
health.”). Those who prefer a more narrow focus on public health, rather than addressing underlying social,
economic, and ecological causes of injury and disease, still include infectious disease control as a duty of the
state). Id. at 39.
27
Id. at 91–92. This authority can be used on a broad spectrum from slight inconveniences to
substantial restrictions on individual liberties; for example, fluoridation of water, helmet and seat belt laws,
to compulsory vaccinations, quarantine and isolation, and even forced medical treatment. Michael Ulrich,
With Child, Without Rights?: Restoring a Pregnant Woman’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Through
the HIV Lens, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 303, 323–34 (2012) [hereinafter Ulrich, With Child]. Involuntary
governmental administration of medical treatment is only allowable in extremely rare circumstances where
there is a judicial determination that the treatment is in the best medical interest of the individual given their
condition, is the least intrusive means necessary to further an essential government interest, and is
substantially unlikely to have side effects inhibiting that government interest. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166, 179 (2003). Despite the safety and efficacy of vaccinations, they are still only compelled indirectly.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (holding a statute constitutional that required a healthy
individual to pay a fine for refusing to receive a smallpox vaccination).
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disease; yet, a government may do more harm than good when it unnecessarily
oversteps its bounds by restricting individual liberty. If people are going to be asked to
sacrifice for the greater good, it is important that they only be asked to accept a
limitation on their liberty when absolutely necessary, and in the least restrictive means
required to achieve that end. Therefore, it is vital that these decisions be based on
sound scientific evidence in order to maintain public trust, even among individuals
who have their own rights constrained.
In the seminal public health law case Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court made it clear that “the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to
be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint.” 28 The Court held
as “settled principle[] [that] the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at
least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will
protect the public health and the public safety.” 29 With recognized authority to limit
individual liberty for the betterment of public health, the question becomes what, if
anything, inhibits the ability of the government to use this power.
Subsequent cases have illustrated that the individual right in question is not a
limitation because even the most fundamental constitutionally protected rights can be
overridden by a duty to protect the general welfare. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court made clear that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to
ill health or death.”30 Indeed, the Court has found broad discretion within the police
powers.31 Despite the fact that this authority is to be used to protect the public, a power
so vast must be limited in order to limit the potential for abuse. 32 After all, “even the
police power is subordinate to the Constitution.”33
Within the Jacobson decision there is an inherent tension between “socialcompact theory” and a “theory of limited government.” 34 Yet, the opinion provides
guidelines for how to balance these two competing theories. 35 First, a risk of harm or
public health threat must be identified to ensure there is a necessity for government
action and to prevent the government from acting arbitrarily. 36 Next, there must be an

28

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 25.
30
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
31
See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (citing Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552
(1905)) (noting that courts “ha[ve] settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in
matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law”).
32
See Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 215 (finding that a “willingness to accept almost without
question an official’s claim that quarantine was justified opened the door to quarantine’s abuse”) (citation
omitted).
33
Parmet, AIDS, supra note 3, at 70.
34
Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil Liberties in
Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 579 (2005).
35
See generally Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11. It may be worth noting that Lawrence Gostin describes the
floor of constitutional protection established in Jacobson through four overlapping standards: “necessity,
reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.” Id. at 579. Although there are similarities between
his description and my own, I find that the categories and protections as I describe them are more distinct
from one another and, thus, clarify the steps that should be taken when evaluating any public health
measure. The approach described also fits within typical case law structure of multi-prong tests where stepby-step analysis is required.
36
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12, 27-28 (using phrases such as “necessary for the public health,” “arbitrary
requirement,” and “necessity of the case ”); see also Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 213 (finding that the
Jacobson court would only uphold the compulsory vaccination when there was evidence “that smallpox
existed in the community”). But see Ulrich, With Child, supra note 27, at 327–28 (determining that the risk
29
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evaluation of whether the approach taken by the state can reasonably be expected to
prevent or mitigate the threat. 37 Finally, there must be a determination of whether the
benefits provided by the public health measure justify the burdens it imposes on civil
liberties.38
Inherent in each of these steps is the necessary role that science and data must
play. An accurate assessment on any of the three prongs requires some expertise or
empirical analysis. While scientific data may not necessarily be dispositive of any of
the three prongs, it undoubtedly should help to clarify each to some degree. More
importantly, the use of data adds to the objectivity and transparency of evaluating
public health measures. The police power grants extremely broad discretion to infringe
upon our most fundamental rights.39 As such, the importance of scientific data in
determining the legality of public health measures cannot be overstated.
Another aspect to this evaluation that is often overlooked, but can be construed as
an additional protective layer of individual rights, is the burden of proof. By beginning
with the threat and the means taken to mitigate that threat, the initial burden of proof
inevitably lies with the State.40 In Jacobson, the Court stated that smallpox, certainly a
serious disease, was prevalent and that the threat was increasing.41 The Court found
that mandatory vaccination was the “method[] most usually employed to eradicate
th[e] disease,”42 and that the effectiveness of vaccines in preventing the spread of
disease was accepted by “most members of the medical profession.” 43 Therefore, the
Court maintained that the methods taken to reduce the harm of smallpox had a “real or
substantial relation to the protection of the public health.” 44
Once the Court found that vaccinations were shown to prevent the spread of
smallpox without generally increasing harms, the burden shifted to the individual
challenging the regulation to prove that it was invalid as applied to them. 45
Importantly, scientific evidence again takes a primary role. The Jacobson Court was
critical of the fact that the plaintiff offered little more than his opinion about his lack of
of transmitting HIV from woman to fetus while pregnant or during birth would not constitute a public health
threat warranting governmental intrusion).
37
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31 (evaluating whether the means utilized by the state have a “real” and
“substantial relation” to the protection of the public health); see also Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 213
(stating that the Court could only uphold the policy if vaccinations were reasonably expected to prevent an
epidemic).
38
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (explaining that where the law “went beyond the necessity of the case and
under the guise of exerting a police power invaded the domain of Federal authority and violated rights
secured by the Constitution, this court deemed it to be its duty to hold such laws invalid”). This third step
can be done as a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. For example, while vaccinations may be an apt
policy generally, they may be unreasonable for an individual who has contraindications such that the
vaccination would seriously jeopardize their health. See, e.g., id. at 30 (describing the statute’s exception for
individuals who are “unfit” to receive vaccinations). Conversely, quarantining an individual who was
exposed to Ebola and had symptoms of infection may be upheld, while a policy that carried a mandatory
quarantine for anyone returning from any African country, including those with no known cases, would fail
due to overinclusiveness. See, e.g., Order Pending Hearing at 3, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (D.
Me. Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Hickox Order] (holding that the state did not prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that the requested mandatory quarantine was necessary to protect the public health).
39
See, e.g., Rebecca Haffajee et al., What is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED.
986, 988 (2014) (“[C]oncerns about due process are amplified when emergency orders restrict individual
freedoms and property rights.”).
40
See Ann L. Abbott, A Summary of Florida’s Law of Quarantine of Persons and Public Health Law
Reform Issues, 2 FL. PUB. HEALTH REV. 10, 12 (2005).
41
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
42
Id. at 28.
43
Id. at 34.
44
Id. at 31.
45
Id. at 35-36.
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faith in vaccinations.46 The Court conceded that it is unconstitutional to subject an
individual to vaccination whose body or health is in a condition that would render the
treatment “cruel and inhuman[e].”47 Yet, in this particular case the plaintiff had not
met his burden of proof, and all evidence suggested “that the vaccine matter to be used
in his case was such as any medical practitioner of good standing would regard as
proper to be used.”48
By placing the burden of proof on the State to produce evidence of a public health
threat and to demonstrate a response that can mitigate that threat with benefits that
generally outweigh its burdens, the judiciary increases the objectivity, transparency,
and accountability of public health measures. While the explicit data analysis in
Jacobson is a bit thin, the opinion must be understood in the context of its time. In
1905, infectious diseases were the leading cause of death, the federal government had
little involvement in health matters, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) was
not yet created, and most vaccines were fifty years away. 49 Still, subsequent public
health law cases bear out the fact that data play a key role in determining
constitutionality of government action.
In Boone v. Boozman, the plaintiff challenged the state requirement that children
be immunized against Hepatitis B to attend school.50 After acknowledging the state’s
authority under the police power to infringe upon fundamental rights of religious
freedom and parental rights in favor of the benefit of the public’s health, the court
turned to the threat in question.51 As the plaintiff argued, and the court conceded,
Hepatitis B did not present the same public health emergency of harm that smallpox
did.52 Nonetheless, the court held, correctly, that Jacobson did not limit its holding “to
diseases presenting a clear and present danger.”53 To make a determination whether
Hepatitis B created a threat that warranted state action, the court turned to science and
empirical evidence.54
There is no defined threshold of what constitutes a threat warranting state action,
but the use of scientific data adds transparency to the determination, which can be
more accurately evaluated at a later time. 55 Thus, while the facts alone may not be
dispositive of appropriate government intervention, the examination of the facts is a
requirement. In the case of Hepatitis B, the court recognized that the virus is spread by
bodily fluids and can survive on surfaces for up to a month. 56 “Hepatitis B [infection]
can lead to sclerosis, scarring and fibrosis of the liver, or liver cancer after chronic
infection[,] . . . . [and] [g]lobally [it] is [the] second . . . leading cause of cancer.” 57 The
court noted that approximately 1.25 million people have chronic Hepatitis B infection
in the United States, with an estimated 80,000 individuals contracting the virus each
46

Id. at 35-37.
Id. at 38–39.
48
Id. at 37.
49
Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s
Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 582 (2005).
50
Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 941 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
51
Id. at 954.
52
Id.
53
Id. (emphasis added).
54
See id.
55
See generally Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public Health:
Talking Point on Public Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REPS. 1099 (2007) (discussing the lack of
any clear criteria for what constitutes a public health threat, and exploring the resulting tensions between
exercises of police power and civil liberties).
56
See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
57
Id.
47
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year.58 Finding this to be a credible public health threat, the court held that
immunization of school children, which has been an accepted use of police power
since the early twentieth century, was reasonable given its “real and substantial
relation to the protection of the public health . . . .”59
Interestingly, the court went beyond this initial assessment to examine risk factors,
noting that “groups at highest risk for Hepatitis B are unlikely to self-identify and
pursue the vaccine.”60 The court felt this, in addition to the fact that it was a
recommended strategy, further justified the required vaccinations. 61 Widely used
vaccinations almost always pass the balancing test due to their minute risk of harm to
the average individual and their substantial effectiveness in prevention.62 With the
plaintiff unable to then meet her burden of proof with evidence that the child would
suffer uncommon harm that would outweigh the benefits, the court upheld the
measure.63
Conversely, cases decided in the name of public health law that do not use
appropriate evaluation and evidentiary standards can set unlawful precedent that
endangers the health and welfare of society. One of the most egregious examples is
Buck v. Bell, where the Court cited to Jacobson for sustaining the forced sterilization
of an eighteen-year-old mentally disabled woman in the name of protecting the public
welfare.64 This case was wrong in every conceivable way, and if it seems misplaced in
a public health discussion, that is because it indisputably should not have been upheld
under the authority of public health law—or any other law for that matter. Yet, it
provides an extreme example of a court blindly paying deference to an overly broad
concept of police powers, with the Court holding that the “principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” 65
In a short opinion considering the unlawful invasion of bodily integrity, the threat
to general welfare that the Court cites is that institutionalized “defective[]” persons
may become “a menace” and that the reduction of this population would “prevent our
being swamped with incompetence.”66 The Court states that “heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility,” and that the plaintiff “is the
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring.” 67 Offering no science, data,
or analysis to support the connection between this supposed threat to society and
sterilization reducing such a threat, the Court held that if the State is of the “opinion
that it is for the best interests of the patient and of society” that an individual be
sterilized, this opinion alone was satisfactory. 68
The Court enforced no burden of proof on the State69 and unconstitutionally
accepted the State’s opinion as fact. In balancing the benefits against the burdens on
the individual, the Court found little risk of harm at all, and instead concluded that the
sterilization procedure could be conducted “without detriment to her general health
58
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See Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
64
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and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.”70 As a
result of this decision, more than 60,000 people were sterilized, most of whom were
poor women.71 Though this case may seem draconian and unrealistic in a modern
discussion of public health law, the fact that sterilizations under this holding continued
into the late 1970s displays the dangers of evaluation without the requirement of
science and how public health law can be misused for targeted discrimination. 72 In
Buck, the Court discussed the procedural requirements for evaluating the case of
someone suggested for sterilization.73 Yet, what good is the right to due process if it
entails little more than judicial deference to decisions made in the name of public
welfare but that are based simply on opinion?
Certainly “science is not value neutral” and can be distorted.74 Its inclusion in no
way guarantees a just outcome nor eliminates the risk of abusing power. However,
placing the burden of proof upon the State to justify the means of protecting the
public’s health with empirical evidence should deter abuses of authority when the
State faces a threat of infectious disease. It also empowers the judiciary to eschew an
archaic era of judicial deference and earnestly balance the liberties of individuals
against state efforts to protect society at large.
III. FEAR AND POLITICS: HOW THE LAW BECOMES A PUBLIC HEALTH
THREAT
As we continue to battle infectious diseases in the future and determine how best
to approach the threat posed to the public, the role of scientific data and empirical
evidence must be at the forefront of the discussion. Though this point may seem
obvious, there are countless examples through our nation’s history that prove
otherwise. Indeed, infectious diseases present an appealing study in public health law
because their connection to science is so readily apparent, yet there is an abundance of
examples exhibiting the ease with which the role of science can be forgotten. As fear,
misinformation, and politics push the objectivity of empirical evidence to the outer
edges of infectious disease response, the data-driven requirements of the law are often
ignored.
The spread of paranoia creates questions in terms of the legality of public health
measures. Without sound scientific reasoning, many infectious disease responses may
in fact be unconstitutional. Moreover, when decisions are made based on distorted
information and lobbying for public approval, they can in actuality generate their own
potential harm to the community. By succumbing to the politicization of how to handle
infectious disease, state officials often ignore their constitutional obligations to protect
the public health through reasonable approaches that have a substantial chance to
mitigate the risk to the general welfare. While it may be suspected that this is most
likely to occur during emergencies, the power of panic and personal beliefs can
transform the law into its own hazard even when it comes to more chronic infectious
diseases.
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A. EBOLA AND PUBLIC HEALTH “EMERGENCIES”
The recent Ebola outbreak presents an interesting example of the reaction to
public health emergencies because there is debate over whether it can actually be
considered a public health emergency. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa certainly
qualifies, with over 28,000 cases and over 11,000 deaths. 75 But when focusing on the
threat in the United States, the appropriateness of the label “emergency” is less clear.
There were four confirmed cases of Ebola in the United States, with one death; 76 yet,
the media coverage made it seem as though the country was in the midst of an
emerging epidemic.77 In reality, “[a] handful of domestic cases of a non-airborne,
slowly-spreading condition like [Ebola] does not constitute an imminent threat to the
larger population’s health.”78 In fact, only Connecticut declared a state of emergency, 79
but at least twenty-three states enacted quarantine measures.80
Though there is some question as to the severity and scope of the threat that Ebola
posed, quarantine under the right circumstances could be a reasonable method to
control the spread of the disease.81 However, despite the mishandling of the initial
Ebola patient in Dallas, Texas,82 and the highly publicized travels through New York
City of a doctor who was infected,83 the response was unnecessarily extreme. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) issued guidance on risk
categories and justifications for quarantine and isolation measures, 84 yet it was
summarily rejected by the twenty-three states passing quarantine measures, which all
opted for stricter policies.85
To be sure, states are under no legal obligation to follow the CDC’s
recommendations.86 However, they are still obligated to meet constitutional
requirements when using their police power and rejecting the guidance of a federal
agency, whose expertise is in creating a patchwork approach to infectious disease
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containment across multiple states, is highly questionable.87 It raises concern about the
scientific justification that the State is using for its own approach, if there is any, and
makes it more difficult for the public to understand what criteria or threshold is being
used in any given state.88
The fact that every state that rejected the guidelines of the CDC opted for stricter
quarantine guidelines, thereby further imposing on individual rights, runs contrary to
the precedent that the government must undertake the “least restrictive alternative.”89
In many of these states, the governors were facing reelection.90 For example, Governor
Christie of New Jersey, in a reelection campaign, declared that any healthcare workers
returning to his state from treating Ebola patients in West Africa were going to be
subject to mandatory quarantine for up to three weeks. 91 This led to the highly
publicized quarantine of Kaci Hickox, discussed earlier, who was held for eighty hours
in a makeshift tent with little evidence of infection other than a temporary reading of a
fever from a forehead scanner, which was later found to be inaccurate. 92 New Jersey
was by no means the only state to implement a mandatory twenty-one day quarantine:
in Connecticut, Governor Dan Malloy, in a tight race for reelection, implemented
mandatory quarantines for anyone traveling from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,
regardless of whether they had any contact with Ebola victims.93 Further, once Ms.
Hickox was released to return to her home in Maine, the governor there also
unnecessarily placed her under mandatory quarantine, although this quarantine was to
take place in her home.94
In a scientific and data-based opinion, a district court judge held that Maine’s
mandatory quarantine was invalid.95 The court relied on information about Ebola and
the dangers of infection provided by members of the CDC, including the fact that
“[i]ndividuals infected with Ebola Virus Disease who are not showing symptoms are
not yet infectious.”96 Applying this information and the standards set under Jacobson,
the court held that the State did not meet its burden of establishing “clear and
convincing evidence” that the mandatory quarantine was necessary to protect the
public’s health.97
The court also made a point to recognize “the misconceptions, misinformation,
bad science and bad information being spread from shore to shore in our country with
respect to Ebola,” and did not succumb to the political pressures to stray from the
precedential requirements of public health law. 98 Following sound public health policy,
the court employed the least restrictive means necessary and ordered Ms. Hickox to
participate in direct active monitoring, to coordinate her travel with public health
authorities, and to immediately notify officials if any symptoms appeared. 99 The
87
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contrast between this approach and that of Governor Christie, who initially
quarantined Ms. Hickox and refused to admit overstepping legal authority,
demonstrates the difference between effective, legally sound public health law and an
authoritarian approach to protecting the general welfare.100
Scientific and medical institutions, along with infectious disease experts, spoke
out against unjustified and unnecessary quarantine measures. 101 The quarantine of
individuals who are asymptomatic or who have not been exposed to Ebola is
scientifically baseless and, thus, a violation of their constitutional rights.102 Given its
restriction on individual freedom, quarantine is perhaps the most intrusive public
health measure outside of treatment by force.103 As such, it should not be undertaken
lightly.
“[Q]uarantine is justified only when there is no other intervention available to
prevent the spread of disease that would be less restrictive of liberty.” 104 Yet, in
Connecticut alone, at least nine people were quarantined who had no “documented
exposure to patients with disease.”105 These numbers, however, are only those that the
state has reported. There was at least one other person in Connecticut who was
unofficially quarantined in a hotel room for two days. 106 The lack of data and
transparency around quarantine actions creates an inability to accurately assess and
account for the constitutional violations and burdens suffered. 107
A recent report analyzed public accounts to determine that at least forty people
were formally quarantined in eighteen states, with another 233 individuals under
“voluntary” quarantine.108 These voluntary quarantines are perhaps most troubling, as
effectuating due process rights becomes even more difficult if there is no formal
request for quarantine. The use of coercion makes the infringement on liberties even
more unsettling, and likely increases the harm to the public by inducing stress and
elevating the psychological toll these people suffer. For example, a physician at
Stanford was threatened with six months in jail if he fought a quarantine and then
received professional scorn for hurting the recruitment of volunteers to help fight
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Ebola abroad when public officials announced in the press that he was voluntarily
quarantining himself.109
These examples demonstrate the indirect harms that are suffered in addition to the
violation of rights and freedoms. As misinformation and fear spread, however, the
government is not the only threat capable of causing indirect harm and coerced
quarantines. In Oklahoma, under public pressure, a teacher agreed to a “voluntary”
quarantine for twenty-one days after a trip to Rwanda, which had zero cases of Ebola
and is thousands of miles away from the western portion of Africa where the Ebola
outbreak occurred.110 Another teacher in Kentucky resigned amidst pressure after she
returned from a mission trip to Kenya, which is also thousands of miles from where
the outbreak occurred and had no reported Ebola cases. 111 Meanwhile, at least twenty
children nationwide were banned from school due to Ebola paranoia, including a seven
year old girl who “traveled to Nigeria after it had been declared Ebola-free by the
[World Health Organization].”112 These actions only help to spread hysteria and lead
to drastic consequences: for example, two boys who were beaten by other students in
the Bronx after returning from a trip to Senegal, which had one case of Ebola. 113
“Th[is] toxic mix of scientific ignorance and paranoia” was endemic in every facet
of society.114 From the media, to politicians, and to the public, each one seemed to feed
off of the erroneous information and anxiety of the other.115 The Ebola response can be
directly linked to “misinformation, politicization,” and hysteria, 116 which ultimately
lead to the law becoming a threat to fundamental rights and the public’s health.
Quarantine is warranted when exposure is coupled with indicators of infection.
Therefore, “wholesale quarantines of [healthcare workers] lacks a scientific
[validation]” and the necessary balance of benefits over burdens required under
Jacobson.117
B. REMOVING THE EMERGENCY EXCUSE
1.

HIV Criminalization
The rush to quarantine individuals due to a distorted understanding of public
health and public health law is nothing new. In the 1980s there was a strong push to
quarantine any individual who tested positive for HIV to help control the epidemic. 118
“There was an AIDS-quarantine ballot initiative in California, and various states
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threatened or passed conditional quarantine measures.” 119 These measures were
infrequently used, and states eventually abandoned the idea of quarantine as an
appropriate response to controlling the spread of HIV. 120
Having dealt with the HIV epidemic for over three decades, the current spread of
the now chronic condition can hardly be categorized as an “emergency.” 121 Yet, the
manner in which some states choose to minimize the spread of the disease lacks
scientific reasoning, and appears more likely to be based on stigma, stereotypes, and
an uneducated comprehension of the condition. 122 Despite medical progress and
enhanced knowledge about the disease, HIV stigma and discrimination are still
prevalent.123 Unsurprisingly, a majority of states utilize criminal laws to prosecute
HIV-positive individuals for certain behavior, thereby using the criminal law as a
deterrent and a means to control the spread of the disease. 124
Between 2008 and 2013, there were at least 180 prosecutions of individuals under
HIV criminalization laws.125 Most importantly, many of the laws used for these
prosecutions do not require intent to transmit the virus or actual transmission of the
virus.126 Consequently, these laws ignore much of what we know today about viral
loads and the risks of transmission. With advanced medical understanding of HIV, we
now know that if the virus is detected early enough and if medication is taken
regularly, an individual can reduce his or her viral load to the point where it is nearly
impossible to transmit the virus. 127 Hence, prosecution of these individuals lacks
scientific justification when considering risk of transmission, especially if additional
measures are taken, such as using a condom.
Nevertheless, that is exactly what happened to a man in Iowa who was sentenced
to twenty-five years in prison for a one-time sexual encounter when he had an
undetectable viral load and used a condom.128 The prosecution was based on the fact
that he knew he was HIV-positive and did not disclose it to his sexual partner. 129 Prior
to sentencing, he spent nine months in prison because he could not afford his $250,000
bond, six weeks of which were spent in solitary confinement.130 Spending twenty-three
hours a day in a cell, he served another four months of his twenty-five year sentence
before a letter-writing campaign had his sentence reduced to time served and required
he register as a sex offender.131 These types of prosecutions are easily distinguished
119
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from those involving people who lie and intentionally expose unknowing partners to
the virus, such as a man in Michigan who “admitted to police that he was trying to
infect as many people as possible” and had unprotected sex with thousands of
partners.132
Criminalization of sexual encounters that contain little risk of transmission are not
even the most egregious examples of laws that run counter to empirical evidence.
Despite the fact that the CDC has concluded that spitting has never been shown to
transfer HIV,133 numerous states have laws criminalizing spitting on others for HIVpositive individuals.134 Contradictory to scientific understanding, convictions have
occurred as recently as 2014,135 and in 2010 an “HIV positive [man] was sentenced to
five years in prison for second-degree assault after he was convicted of spitting on a
police officer.”136
Without proper scientific justification, these laws are not only objectionable from
a legal standpoint, but they are also bad public health policy as well. 137 To be punished
under these statutes a person must know they are HIV-positive.138 Therefore, these
laws might incentivize people to avoid learning their status. Public health officials
have spent years encouraging everyone to get tested, and research funding is being
directed at discovering easier ways for people to determine whether they are HIVpositive.139 Yet, these laws counteract those efforts. They further compound their
ineffectiveness by perpetuating stigma of both the disease and the HIV-positive
community, which only stands to exacerbate the public health harm these laws create.
2.

Childhood Vaccinations
Another example of the tension between science, politics, and paranoia outside of
the context of an emergency is the seemingly endless debate over childhood
vaccination requirements. It is unquestioned that states have the authority to pass
compulsory vaccination laws, and every state mandates that children be vaccinated to
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attend school.140 But all states allows exemptions for medical contraindications to
immunization, which are justified because the harms to the individual are not
outweighed by the benefits since herd immunity can be achieved without vaccinating
individuals who fall under this exemption.141 Controversy exists because forty-seven
states allow religious exemptions and twenty states allow philosophical exemptions,
with Mississippi, West Virginia, and now California allowing neither.142
As discussed earlier, religious exemptions for generally applicable vaccination
laws are not constitutionally required.143 Therefore, philosophical exemptions are not
required either.144 In fact, the reason that Mississippi does not allow for religious
exemptions is because the Supreme Court of Mississippi declared them
unconstitutional in Brown v. Stone.145 In this case, the court held the exemptions
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “in that it would
require the great body of school children to be vaccinated and at the same time expose
them to the hazard of associating with children exempted under the religious
exemption . . . .”146
Meanwhile, other courts have questioned the ability and wisdom of the State in
attempting to evaluate which beliefs properly fall within these exemptions. 147 States
have varying requirements for obtaining religious and philosophical exemptions,
ranging from signing a standardized form to a more arduous screening process.148 In
LePage v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court had “questions concerning the extent to
which the government should be involved in the religious lives of its citizens.” 149
Meanwhile, the court in Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School
District struck down the exemption in the statute that was limited to “bona fide
members of a recognized religious organization.” 150 The court utilized the three-prong
test established by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman to determine the
constitutionality of laws challenged under the Establishment Clause, and held that this
exemption provision violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.151 The court opined that governmental investigation into a
person’s beliefs “in essence puts the individual on trial for heresy.” 152
140
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142
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Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)) (“The constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion does
not excuse an individual from compulsory immunization; in this instance, the right to free exercise of
religion and parental rights are subordinated to society’s interest in protecting against the spread of
disease.”); see also Gostin, Politics, supra note 140, at 1099 (“Because vaccine laws are generally applicable
to all school-aged children and in the public interest, the courts find no overriding right to religious
freedom.”).
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Gostin, Politics, supra note 140, at 1099.
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Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979).
146
Id. at 223.
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In McCarthy v. Boozman, the religious exemption in question was analyzed under
the Lemon test as well and was judged to have failed at least the second and third
prongs, if not all three.153 The court found that because there was a limited religious
scope and only certain denominational preferences were afforded the choice, the
exemption failed under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 154 While there is a legitimate
state interest in trying to limit improper evasion of immunization, it is clear that this
interest cannot compel the state to deem certain beliefs more valid than others.155
Consequently, it appears the safest way to include a constitutional exemption is to
allow anyone who wants to opt out of vaccinations to do so, which would jeopardize
the entire purpose of a mandatory vaccination law.
If these exemptions are not constitutionally required and they are so difficult to
constitutionally implement in a manner that would limit their exploitation, why do so
many states incorporate them into their vaccination laws? Again, it can be traced
largely to misinformation, fear, and politics.156 A distorted view of the risks associated
with childhood vaccination stems from a fraudulent report connecting the Measles,
Mumps, and Rubella (“MMR”) vaccine to autism; however, there are also individuals
who believe vaccines can cause other dangers to children.157 Meanwhile, a growing
number of parents do not believe that vaccines fit in their vision of an organic, allnatural upbringing.158
Despite vaccinations being one of the greatest public health achievements, and the
scientific consensus that childhood vaccines are safe and effective, a large number of
children are being put at risk due to political pressures and misrepresentations of
facts.159 “Vaccine refusal has been associated with outbreaks of invasive H. influenzae
type b disease, varicella, pneumococcal disease, measles, and pertussis.” 160 The CDC
“declared endemic measles eliminated in 2000” and, yet, in 2014 the United States had
the largest number of cases since 2000 with 644. 161 In 2015, the CDC reported 121
153
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Id. at 949.
See id. (“[T]he exemption fails to measure up under the third Lemon factor because the State is
required to involve itself in religious matters to an inordinate degree by delving into religious dogma to
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157
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wound up with profound mental disorders after vaccines.’” Id. Because the MMR-autism study was first
published in a reputable, scientific journal, there is a strong argument that at the time this provided some
empirical evidence to question the benefits and burdens evaluation of the vaccine. See Jeffrey S. Gerber &
Paul A. Offit, Vaccines and Autism: A Tale of Shifting Hypotheses, 48 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 456,
456 (2009). But this case study also provides an example of the importance of scientific consensus and the
need to assess research methodology. In the case of a connection between MMR and autism, this one study
was proven to be improper science, and numerous studies followed that have subsequently shown there is no
connection between the two, providing a more rigorous scientific consensus. See Gerber & Offit, supra, at
456. A more lengthy discussion of what constitutes scientific consensus and what would be an appropriate
response to a study such as the initial autism publication is important, but beyond the scope of this article.
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See, e.g., Jack Healy & Michael Paulson, Vaccine Critics Turn Defensive Over Measles, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/vaccine-critics-turn-defensive-overmeasles.html (describing that some parents are “suspicious of pharmaceutical companies and big business
[because] . . . ‘they [try to] raise their children in a natural, organic environment’”).
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See Alina Sadaf et al., A Systematic Review of Interventions for Reducing Parental Vaccine Refusal
and Vaccine Hesitancy, 31 VACCINE 4293, 4293 (2013) (citation omitted) (“The success of vaccines in
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160
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measles cases in a little over a month stemming from an outbreak that began at
Disneyland in California.162 The Disneyland outbreak was so severe that there may
have been a greater risk of death from the spread of measles than from the Ebola
“emergency.”163
Meanwhile, pertussis, or whooping cough, 164 has reemerged with a study showing
“that states with easy nonmedical exemption[s]” have a fifty percent higher rate of the
disease.165 During an outbreak in between 2011 and 2012, forty-nine states reported a
surge in cases and “20 deaths [were] reported nationally.”166 And in 2013, there were
approximately 25,000 cases across the country. 167
While parental rights are important and deserve respect, they do not supersede
state obligations to protect the public’s health or the health of any child.168 Courts have
consistently held that the religious or philosophical beliefs of a parent do not grant
them a constitutional right to place their child at risk of harm simply because they are
not at the age of majority.169 Certainly few people would question judicial intervention
to overrule a parent’s decision to forgo a child’s blood transfusion due to religious or
personal beliefs.170 Yet thousands of children are needlessly placed at risk as a result of
the politics and personal philosophies that reject an abundance of empirical evidence
demonstrating vaccine safety, efficacy, and public health benefit.
IV. PUTTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BACK IN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
“If there is one article of faith in public health, it is that policy should be based on
objective and rigorous scientific methodologies.” 171 This sentiment seems so obvious
and, yet, there are countless examples of how public health law, whether being
exercised through the legislative, executive, or judiciary branch, has failed to meet this
standard. It is important to reiterate that this not only raises constitutional concerns, it
ultimately is bad for the public’s health. When the law becomes its own threat to
general welfare, concern should arise about the sincerity of whether the state actually
has society’s best interest as its primary concern. When decisions are hastily made or
162
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based more on public fear and political pressures, the public trust in public health law
is inevitably going to falter.172 Through a refocused effort to recognize the scientific
foundations of public health law, a coordinated effort among state and federal public
health partners, and more appropriate judicial oversight, we may be able to restore the
legality of, and faith in, the law’s ability to protect, and even improve, society’s wellbeing.
A. RENEWED FOCUS ON HEALTH
Though Ebola is not the only infectious disease of concern, and quarantine is not
the only public health measure that can be deleterious to health when misused, the
mishandling of the Ebola “outbreak” in the United States provides a tangible, recent
example of what can go wrong when decisions are made without a focus on science
and data. The emphasis on scientific data as justification for actions to control
infectious disease is not only necessary to protect civil liberties, but also to increase the
chance that policies will improve health outcomes. “[W]e have no hope for
meaningfully and effectively responding to pressing societal challenges if we distort
the facts to engineer outcomes that satisfy our preexisting biases or political
allegiances.”173 Providing sound, data-driven justifications for infringing upon
individual rights enables a more efficient public health response by building trust with
the population whose constitutional rights are being limited.174 It creates public trust
not only by encouraging confidence in the rationale for the decisions made, but also in
the accountability of those making the decisions. 175
Public trust is key to an effective public health response. Providing the public with
data enables them to better understand the threat and what they can do individually to
help mitigate potential harm. A lack of trust could cause many to “cease complying
with . . . recommendations,” thereby exacerbating the risks of spreading the disease.176
Compulsory measures should be a last resort, not just to protect liberty, but because
encouraging voluntary measures helps to maintain the belief that the citizenry has a
role to play in controlling the disease. 177 A dictatorial response is likely to cause
people to feel they have no say in the matter. 178 Feeling a lack of control, especially in

172
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See Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 218. This may be especially problematic in minority and lowincome populations that may already have a lack of trust in the medical community and compulsory
governmental action, and who already suffer disproportionately from health burdens. History suggests “that
coercive laws have largely targeted disadvantaged minorities[,] . . . . [with] [q]uarantine laws . . . most often
directed at disfavored immigrant groups.” Mariner et al., supra note 49, at 588.
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See Childress et al., supra note 174, at 174.
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See Mariner et al., supra note 49, at 588 (“The public will support reasonable public health
interventions if they trust public health officials to make sensible recommendations that are based on science
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public health emergencies where anxiety is heightened, enhances the possibility that
people will become more defiant.179
The emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) presents
another recent example that illustrates the importance of public trust in their
government’s methods of handling infectious diseases. 180 Despite the severe and
sudden emergence of SARS, there was little need to install compulsory quarantines by
force because, as with most serious public health threats, most people were happy “to
take precautionary measures voluntarily.” 181 Yet, in Beijing, China, a rumor that the
government was planning an involuntary, large-scale quarantine caused nearly 250,000
people to flee, unquestionably increasing the risk that the disease would spread. 182
Again, the suspicion of government abuse of coercive powers increased the probability
of harm.183
The unwillingness of states to utilize self-monitoring is even more puzzling in the
case of Ebola. Many individuals quarantined were healthcare workers returning from
efforts to stem the tide of the epidemic in West Africa, trained professionals with
Ebola experience and expertise, and people familiar with the transmission, symptoms,
and consequences of the disease.184 Moreover, these individuals understood that their
best chance for survival was to report any symptoms as soon as they arose.185 This is a
group that is best equipped to self-monitor, and if the government refuses to trust
them, what are the odds that they would trust anyone else in a future infectious disease
scenario?
And, certainly, the media has a role to play. 186 Even though Dr. Spencer traveled
throughout New York City before reporting to the hospital with a fever, his eventual
reporting should have been hailed as an example of the ability of healthcare workers to
self-monitor.187 After forty years of accruing scientific data on Ebola, we know that
individuals are not contagious in early symptomatic stages when they are experiencing
a fever, and so Dr. Spencer reported to the hospital to be tested before becoming
contagious.188 Indeed, despite the hysteria surrounding his travels within the city, no
other individual contracted Ebola from Dr. Spencer’s decision to go bowling or use
public transportation.189 Yet, his ability to move freely is one of the primary thrusts
behind political and public support of mandatory quarantines.
179
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371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029 (2014)) (“[F]ever precedes the contagious stage, allowing workers who
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The continued politicization of infectious disease response only stands to enhance
the lack of confidence in government decision-making, especially absent objective
scientific justification. For example, seventy-six percent of Democrats had a favorable
view of the federal government’s Ebola response, as compared to fifty-four percent of
Republicans.190 Meanwhile, “72% of Republicans expressed confidence in the federal
government’s response. . . . to [the] avian flu in 2006” when their party was in power,
while 52% of Democrats approved.191 Given the importance demonstrated in public
trust and cooperation to control the spread of disease, these statistics are quite
interesting. During infectious disease outbreaks, apprehensiveness is high, and
government officials may feel political pressure to take strong action. 192 Yet, it is
exactly in these circumstances when abuses of power are most likely to occur. 193
Empirical evidence is critical to the public’s acceptance of whether these decisions are
justifiable, and to persuade them that they are based on more than the momentum of
politics.194
In addition to increasing the community’s cooperation, trust, and adherence to
public health policies, a sound scientific foundation can improve the response to
control the disease in indirect yet very important ways. With years of funding cuts and
political apathy stripping funds available for public health response, it is imperative
that frontline efforts of healthcare workers, such as physicians and nurses, be
encouraged.195 Needlessly forcing quarantines on those we rely on to stay the spread of
disease is counterproductive and a waste of limited resources. 196 Compulsory policies
that lack scientific justification are likely to discourage healthcare workers from
voluntarily putting themselves at risk.197 Moreover, the cost of placing twenty-four
hour surveillance and unnecessarily quarantining 2815 military members at $2000 per
person hardly seems worth the expenses demanded from taxpayers. 198
Unreasonably quarantining people not only restricts their freedoms by
constraining them to a specified location, but it places them at risk of secondary harms
as well. There are lost wages that accrue from being unable to work, and a risk of
losing one’s job entirely, which in turn has disparate impact on those of low
socioeconomic status.199 A small minority of states have enacted laws prohibiting
employment discrimination against individuals in quarantine, but many of those laws
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that have been passed are quite “weak.” 200 Some do not apply to those who voluntarily
enter quarantine, and Iowa is the only state affording a remedy of reinstatement. 201
Meanwhile, Massachusetts is the only state to offer compensation, but a 1907 law
limits that compensation to three dollars per day. 202
There is also the damage caused by stigmatization, which is largely fueled by
misinformation. Many people, who never became infected, were never symptomatic,
never exposed, or never in the vicinity of where Ebola victims, were tormented,
mistreated, and unable to return to work or school.203 The inability of the government
to provide accurate information to the public and enact complimentary legislation to
minimize harms suffered only adds to the injurious effects of infectious diseases. Too
often public health decisions are made with a narrow focus. The aggregated costs
suffered due to inefficient and unnecessary state action certainly outweigh the benefits
of over-inclusive public health policies.204 Given the diminished resources of the
public health infrastructure, evidence-based practice in infectious disease is not only a
legal imperative, but a moral imperative as well. 205
B. COORDINATION OVER FEDERALISM
It is unquestioned that states have the constitutional authority and obligation to
protect the public’s health through their police power.206 Yet, it is important to
remember that they do not hold exclusive jurisdiction over public health matters. 207 A
debate over federalism is beyond the scope of this paper and, arguably, should be
beyond the scope of infectious disease response. 208 A discussion over the role of the
states versus the federal government in controlling the spread of disease should remain
pragmatic to ensure an efficient and effective response. “A national, state, and local
presence exists in most spheres of public health” 209 and, in terms of constraining
infectious diseases, especially during emergency epidemics, the role of each is critical.
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Unlike most advanced industrial countries, the United States does not have a
national public health agency.210 As such, coordination and collaboration among the
various levels of government are vital to successfully counter disease outbreaks. 211
State and local authorities will be able to assess the circumstances on the ground and
respond swiftly;212 therefore, it would be counterproductive to remove their power to
address these diseases. However, depending on the magnitude of the crisis, an
appropriate response likely still requires coordination among the states rather than ad
hoc approaches that may counteract one another and confuse the public.213
It would seem logical to enable the CDC to coordinate large-scale, multistate
responses, as they already provide states with “technical assistance, research, [data,
and] guidance.”214 However, states’ willingness to disregard the CDC’s expert
recommendations undermines the CDC’s credibility and authority on disease
control.215 The CDC was criticized and questioned once Ebola entered the United
States and began to spread to multiple states while local officials simultaneously
ignored the CDC’s guidance.216 Some even questioned how or why states would fail to
follow CDC’s guidance, as this failure displayed a lack of understanding and
transparency of the roles of federal versus state authorities.217 While the states are
under no statutory obligation to follow the CDC,218 the federal agency with expertise
in infectious diseases should be empowered to coordinate efforts among the states and
to educate the public to minimize fragmentation and misunderstanding. 219
210

Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5.
Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Is the United States Prepared for Ebola?, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2497,
2497 (2014) (The importance of coordination is recognized in the fact that the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act was passed, and reauthorized in 2013, to ensure effective coordination between federal,
state, and local health departments during disasters.).
212
See generally Lainie Rutkow, An Analysis of State Public Health Emergency Declarations, 104 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1601 (2014).
213
Gonsalves & Staley, supra note 87, at 2348 ; see also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5 (discussing how
“interstate variations” tend to “confuse the public”); Jason W. Sapsin et al., SARS and International Legal
Preparedness, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 155, 167 (2004) (quoting U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03373, BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS VARIED ACROSS STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS: REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 5 (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03373.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2R92-S6CE]) (during the SARS outbreak “states lacked sufficient coordination with their
neighboring states”). To facilitate collaboration, it is also important that federal, state, and local laws be
examined carefully to ensure they do not impede efficient responses to emergencies. See Rutkow, supra note
212, at 1601 (“This collaboration can be facilitated or impeded by laws at all levels of government.”). In
fact, “the Institute of Medicine recently recommended that state and local governments review and
modernize their laws . . . to [improve their ability] . . . to address contemporary challenges to population
health.’” Lainie Rutkow et al., The Public Health Workforce and Willingness to Respond to Emergencies: A
50-State Analysis of Potentially Influential Laws, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 64, 64 (2014) (quoting INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: REVITALIZING LAW AND POLICY TO MEET NEW CHALLENGES 2
(2011), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/For-the-Publics-HealthRevitalizing-Law-and-Policy-to-Meet-New-Challenges/For%20the%20Publics%20Health%202011%
20Report%20Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/8L4V-K8SN]).
214
Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5.
215
Id.
216
See Hodge, supra note 10, at 364-67. Certainly some missteps by the CDC helped to fuel the fire by
providing enabling politicians to point to mistakes as a justification for not following any of the agency’s
guidance. See ACLU & GHJP, supra note 80, at 20-21.
217
Hodge, supra note 10, at 367.
218
Id. at 367 (finding that state officials do not have to follow CDC guidance outside of a federallydeclared emergency or federal funding tied to adherence to federal conditions).
219
See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5 (discussing the decentralized and fragmented system of public
health responsibility and the counterproductive nature of ignoring CDC guidance). At the federal level
alone, an infectious disease emergency can require efforts from the Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Transportation, Customs and Border Protection, Food and Drug Administration, National
211

280

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

The CDC bases its recommendations on research and data,220 with less political
influence than state politicians. A stronger role of a federal, expert authority basing
decisions on objective measures, rather than poll numbers, would increase the
likelihood that decisions are made in the best interest of health. At the federal level,
there is additional insulation from more localized political pressures, which creates a
better environment for making data-driven decisions.
During the Ebola scare, there were demands made for President Obama to employ
closure strategies along the border and install travel restrictions to and from certain
countries.221 Yet, President Obama resisted,222 following the guidance of the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the CDC.223 Border closures and travel restrictions
hurt the fight against Ebola by making it more difficult to get supplies, personnel, and
resources to West Africa to fight the disease, and by potentially driving the disease
“underground, causing the outbreak to spread undetected and continue indefinitely.”224
This is not to say, however, that mistakes or questionable decisions cannot happen at
the federal level. President Obama’s decision to implement enhanced screening for
Ebola at five domestic airports has been described as “wasteful, specious, and harmful
to the public’s health,” with a feeling that the decision was made due to pressure from
Congress and media scrutiny.225
There is also a question as to how intrastate any infectious disease can truly be
anymore. “We live in a world where we are all connected by the air we breathe, the
water we drink, the food we eat, and by airplanes that can bring disease from anywhere
to anywhere in a day.”226 While deliberations over the role of state versus federal
government “seem to arise in nearly every major, modern infectious disease health
threat[,]”227 these debates seem out of date and ignorant of modern times. Illustrative
of this point is the measles outbreak mentioned earlier, which began in Disneyland in
California and quickly spread to seventeen states.228 Again, the point is not to remove
the role of the state and local officials to respond to the needs and health of their
citizens. It is merely to accept the fact that to tackle most infectious diseases, or at least
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a true outbreak, there needs to be a coordinated interstate effort that is well informed
on best practices for protecting the public’s health. 229
C. SCIENCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
“In a constitutional democracy, particularly in a field in which empirical
information is critical, there is always a question of what role courts should play in
reviewing the decisions of the politically accountable branches.” 230 As previously
mentioned, the State is within its right to infringe upon individual rights for the
protection of the public’s health.231 But given the advances in law and science, a court
granting unquestioned deference to the State would be archaic.232 Indeed, a willingness
to unquestioningly accept the government’s claim of justification is what “opens the
door to . . . abuse.”233
The judiciary has a strong obligation to scrutinize these decisions, as it is also
quite clear that there are limits on the power to restrain civil liberties in the name of the
general welfare. After all, “[t]o what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by
those intended to be restrained?”234 In the public health sense, it is required that there
be a sufficient risk of harm, a manner which can be rationally thought to mitigate that
harm, and that the burdens of restricting individual rights are sufficiently outweighed
by the benefits.235 Thus, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is” 236 and to enforce those constitutional limitations
when the other branches of government overstep their bounds.
The judiciary’s role in providing a check on unnecessary public health measures is
nothing new. In 1900, the court in Jew Ho v. Williamson struck down a quarantine
imposed on Chinese residents in San Francisco not only because of its discriminatory
intent, but also because it did not have the requisite ability to actually control the
spread of disease.237 Physicians submitted expert opinions on the ability of the
quarantine to achieve the government’s stated goal, and the court found that it “cannot
ignore this evidence . . . as to the ineffectiveness of this method of quarantine against
such a disease as this.”238
Despite the court relying on experts over a century ago to determine whether a
state order would actually improve the public’s health, this precedent has not held
through the years. For example, during World War I over 20,000 women were
quarantined “on suspicion of spreading syphilis and gonorrhea” when many of those
being held had neither disease.239 Most of these women were suspected prostitutes,
begging the question of whether these measures were undertaken for public health or
criminal purposes.240 Unfortunately, through the years the precedent of deference has
229
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seemed to carry more weight than the precedent of stringent evaluation of a reasonable
connection to the government’s means and the public health ends. 241
Not all cases will involve such overt invidiousness as the Jew Ho case, and absent
this blatant disregard for equal protection many courts simply look the other way. 242
Courts must reassert themselves as the last line of protection for civil rights when there
is a risk of governmental abuse of power. With a clear restriction on individual
liberties, the judiciary must require “clear and convincing evidence.”243 It is in times of
panic when there is greater potential for authoritarian governance that judicial
oversight is most sorely needed.
The recent Ebola scare exposes the discrepancy of consequences that can occur
when there is proper judicial appraisal and when it is absent. Kaci Hickox was stuck
for over eighty hours in a tent without cause or sufficient explanation, and with no
judicial approval prior to the quarantine. 244 Conversely, it was the sound legal analysis
of a judge in Maine that released Ms. Hickox from an unnecessary quarantine for lack
of sufficient scientific evidence.245 While Ms. Hickox was eventually released from an
excessively overbearing restriction, countless others were held absent sufficient
evidence-based reasoning.246 Given the severe deprivation of liberty that quarantine
entails, courts cannot continue the habit of providing “rubber stamp[s]” of approval. 247
As stated previously, the abuse of quarantine power is but one example of the
potential for unjustifiable laws in the name of public health. Similar to the quarantine
of prostitutes under the guise of preventing the spread of venereal disease, HIV
criminalization laws unjustifiably conflate public health and criminal laws. 248 Courts
must carefully examine these laws when cases come before them. “The courts must
obey the constitution, rather than the lawmaking department of government, and must,
upon their own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular case, these limits
have been passed.”249
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Ignorance of empirical evidence can no longer be an excuse for unconstitutional
public health policy. It is inaccurate to understand courts as simply deciding the case
before them because, just as laws can impact stigma and social understanding of
infectious disease, so too do courts play an instrumental role in establishing the norms
of society.250 Their power to create precedent carries weight not only with other courts
or future cases, but also with public perception. Therefore, it is imperative that courts
accept their role and duty to uphold evidence-based standards in public health law and
to force the often slow evolution of politics to hasten itself toward justice.
V. CONCLUSION
This emphasis on scientific evidence is no panacea for every public health matter
where a just balance must be struck between individual rights and the general welfare.
Indeed, empirical evidence is not required in all legal determinations, and in many
disputes data is unlikely to be dispositive.251 Furthermore, scientific facts will not
answer normative questions or make inherently difficult decisions in times of crisis
easier to make.252 But what it will do is restore a rational and constitutional approach
to improving the public’s health.
The Ebola “outbreak” in the United States was relatively small and, yet, hundreds
of lives were impacted by the actions of the government, rather than by the disease
itself. If a similar approach is taken for a larger epidemic in this country, the burdens
suffered from state action could be even more severe, not only in terms of direct and
indirect harms from government measures, but also from the potentially unwarranted
actions that may increase the spread of disease. With the increase of social media, the
twenty-four-hour news cycle, and partisan politics, the risk of fear driving legal
decision-making may be rising. There must be a reemphasis on the scientific
requirements of public health law now—not once another infectious disease has
emerged.
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government’s purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”253 It
is long past the time when experience should have taught us that the best means for
protecting civil liberties and the public’s health in the context of infectious disease is
to require scientific support for governmental action. The politicization of public
health has grown into its own epidemic and has transformed the law into a public
health threat. The most disappointing aspect of the response is that the antidote—
utilizing empirical evidence—is already available, but this remedy needs to be taken
much more regularly.
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